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Managing Economic Crises;  




he year 1994 was one of the most tumultuous in the modern history 
of Mexico.  During that year, two major political ﬁgures were 
assassinated, an uprising against the federal government began 
in the state of Chiapas, and the government attempted to ﬁnance 
its deﬁcit payments with various debt instruments.  The political instability 
caused by the assassinations and the Zapatista uprising, along with continued 
economic uncertainty within Mexico, caused foreign investment capital to ﬂee 
Mexico.  Because of this capital ﬂight, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo, decided 
in December of 1994 to devalue the Mexican currency.  Instead of helping the 
situation, it actually caused more panic from foreign investors.  More capital left 
Mexico and the government was in danger of defaulting on its debt payments. 
During this time period, President Bill Clinton kept a close eye on the situation 
with Mexico. Because of NAFTA and other economic agreements, the Mexican 
and American economies were intertwined more than ever.  Mexico’s inability to 
pay their debts, the increasing political instability, and the downward spiral in the 
economy worried many in the United States that it would have an adverse affect 
on a still recovering American economy.  
On January 11, 1995, President Clinton announced that he was considering 
a series of economic measures to help the Mexican economy.  On January 18, 
1995, after consulting with Congressional leaders, Clinton implored Congress 
to approve a series of loan guarantees for the Mexican government to prop 
up their ailing economy. On January 31, 1995, because of Congressional 
inaction, Clinton announced that he was using his executive authority to 
provide the Mexican government, along with funds from the International 
Monetary Fund, with billions of dollars in loan guarantees.  The president was 
widely cheered by the international community for his successful handling of 
the crisis (Walt, 2000).  Over the next two months, Clinton continued to 
talk about the Mexican crisis, providing updates of the situation, holding it 
out as exemplar of quick action by the American government, and using it 
is an example for international audiences to discuss international economic 
regulatory reform.  The question that this study seeks to answer is how did 
Clinton rhetorically manage the Mexican peso crisis?
Studying Clinton’s rhetoric surrounding the Mexican peso crisis is warranted 
on a couple of different levels. First, the study of presidential crisis rhetoric 
has been a fruitful line of research for scholars for the past thirty years (for 
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examples see: Bass, 1992; Bostdorff, 1994; Butler, 2002; 
Cherwitz, 1980; Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986; Dow, 1989; 
Hahn, 1980; Heisey, 1986; Kiewe, 1993; Kuypers, 1997; Paris, 
2002; Pratt, 1970; Windt, 1973). However, this literature 
focuses primarily on how presidents dealt with various military 
interventions.  There is little no scholarship focusing on 
presidential rhetoric and economic crises. In a survey of the 
crisis literature, Bostdorff et. al (2008) argued that one of the 
severe weaknesses of this literature is the lack of exploration 
of how American presidents tackle tough economic situations. 
Considering that a president’s discourse on the economy is one 
of the essential aspects of his leadership (Wood, 2007) and 
the lack of scholarship on this subject, an analysis of Clinton’s 
communication on the Mexican Peso Crisis is warranted.   
Additionally, President Clinton is an important transitional 
president in the history of American foreign policy.  Clinton’s 
leadership helped America adapt and manage the transition 
from the Cold War to an era of globalization (Clinton Foreign 
Policy, 2000).  The Mexican peso crisis is an important chapter 
in that transition.  As yet, there has been no extensive study 
of Clinton and the Mexican peso crisis.  Considering that the 
United States and the world currently face a huge economic 
emergency, understanding how the 42nd president managed 
this crisis may lay the groundwork for a larger theory about 
presidents and economic crisis management, while potentially 
establish a best practices model for other political leaders to 
emulate.  Thus, studying how Clinton rhetorically managed 
the Mexican peso crisis has the potential to make theoretical 
inroads in the larger literature on crisis rhetoric.
To that end, this essay proceeds in four parts.  First, I provide 
a brief outline of the literature on presidential crisis rhetoric. 
Then, I outline the method for this particular study.  Thirdly, I 
analyze President Clinton’s rhetoric on the Mexican Peso Crisis 
over a two month period.  Finally, I draw conclusions from this 
analysis.
Crisis Rhetoric
Over the past thirty years there have been a number of studies 
conducted on the American presidency and crisis situations. 
These studies have covered events like the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Bostdorff, 1994; Pratt, 1970), The Gulf of Tonkin crisis 
(Cherwitz & Zagacki, 1986), the Dominican Republic (Bass, 
1985), the Mayaguez affair (Hahn, 1990), Grenada (Bostdorff, 
1994; Heisey, 1986), Somalia (Butler, 2002), and Kosovo 
(Paris, 2002).  In these studies, scholars have focused on three 
issues when discussing crises: 1) deﬁning what a crisis is; 2) 
classifying the different types of speeches; 3) discussing the 
different rhetorical strategies presidents use in managing these 
crises.  When communication scholars focus on presidential 
crises, they argue that they are rhetorical constructions.  That is 
how a president describes the crisis, creates our understanding 
of the situation as a crisis or not (Kuypers, 2006).  The reason 
for that is that “[I]nternational crises often appear suddenly, 
are usually complex, and do not allow easy interpretation by 
the public. Presidential statements act to create a stable context 
from which to interpret the crisis” (Kuypers, 2006, p. 4 - 5). 
In other words, presidential crisis rhetoric serves as a means of 
educating the American public about the complex situations that 
arise in everyday life. Studies have found that presidential crisis 
speeches contain three deﬁning characteristics: 1) the president’s 
assertion of possession of “New Facts” about a situation that 
deﬁne it as a crisis, 2) a melodramatic comparison between the 
pure motives of the United States and the evil motives of the 
enemy, and 3) a shifting of the issue, including the policy for 
which the President desires support, from a practical, political 
context to a moral, ethical context (Dow, 1989).
 A second issue in the literature regarding crisis rhetoric has 
been the different classiﬁcation schemes.  Cherwitz and Zagacki 
(1986) divided crisis speeches into two types of discourse: 
consummatory and justiﬁcatory.  Consummatory rhetoric is 
present when the president’s discourse is the only ofﬁcial reply 
made by the American government and “endeavor[s] to show 
the people of the U.S., as well as the world community, that 
enemy attacks were hostile and unprovoked, and that despite 
such aggression the U.S. will not respond, for to do so would 
justify violence” (p. 309).  Justiﬁcatory rhetoric is present 
“where presidential discourse was from the very beginning part 
of a larger, overt military retaliation taken by the government 
of the U.S.” (p. 308) and “focus[es] on explanation and 
rationalization of military retaliation” (p. 309).  Dow (1989) 
argued that crisis situations can be put into two categories: 
epideictic and deliberative.  Dow argues that “rhetoric which 
responds to critical events is characterized by epideictic strategies 
that function to allow the audience to reach a communal 
understanding of the events which have occurred” (p. 297). 
Deliberative rhetorical strategy serves the purpose of gaining 
approval for a speciﬁc presidential action, which replaces the 
approval of Congress, which would be needed for the president 
to make a formal declaration of war (Dow, 1989).  
Perhaps, the biggest focus within the scholarship concerning 
crisis rhetoric has been on the different rhetorical strategies that 
scholars have explored.  Paris (2002) demonstrated that President 
Clinton got involved in a metaphor war with the Congress 
over justifying the intervention into Kosovo. In analyzing the 
rhetoric of Presidents Johnson, Eisenhower, and Reagan, as it 
related to the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, and Grenada, 
Procter (1987) advocated that these presidents asserted that the 
United States needed to intervene to quell a chaotic scene, lest 
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the violence spread elsewhere.  Bostdorff (1994) maintained 
that President Reagan used myths of mission and manifest 
destiny when justifying the military incursion into Grenada. A 
common thread through all these studies is that they argue that 
presidential crisis rhetoric is structured by a savage/civilization 
binary.  Bostdorff (1994) observed that crisis situations are 
“conducive to hero vs. villain polarizations” (p. 7).   Windt 
(1973) asserted that the establishment of good versus evil is 
a basic line of argument within crisis rhetoric.  Cherwitz and 
Zagacki (1986) argue that both types of crisis rhetoric they 
study, consummatory and justiﬁcatory, seek to identify and 
blame adversaries while at the same time commending U.S. 
action (see also Bass, 1985; Cherwitz, 1980; Heisey, 1986).  In 
other words, presidents deﬁne the enemy in terms that make 
it appear as if the enemy is irrational, barbaric, and diabolical. 
By contrast, the president will use language that portrays U.S. 
action as heroic and righteous with the goal of protecting 
democracy and innocent lives.
This review of literature reveals varying conclusions about 
presidential crisis rhetoric.  First, we can conclude that 
scholarship on presidential crisis rhetoric focuses on acts 
involving military intervention. Second, presidential crisis 
rhetoric are rhetorical constructions that serve as a means for 
the American public to understand complex and intricate 
international problems. Third, there are different classiﬁcation 
systems for crisis rhetoric. Finally, presidential crisis rhetoric for 
military intervention shares some common rhetorical strategies, 
namely that they justify a call to arms through a savage/
civilization binary.  While the conclusions generated here are 
important, they also point to some signiﬁcant gaps in the crisis 
literature.  First and foremost, there is little to no scholarship 
on presidential crisis rhetoric relating to how presidents deal 
with economic crises at home or abroad.  Additionally, after 
reading Clinton’s speeches on the crisis situation with Mexico, 
it became apparent that Clinton was not using a savage/
civilization binary when advocating solutions to the Mexican 
peso crisis.  This led me to ultimately conclude that the current 
scholarship does not provide a sufﬁcient theoretical guide in 
analyzing President Clinton’s rhetoric concerning the Mexican 
Peso Crisis.  To that end, my analysis approaches studying 
Clinton’s discourse in a different manner.  Speciﬁcally, I use 
a framing analysis to demonstrate the dominant strategies the 
president used to navigate this crisis.  In the following section, 
I expand on what a framing analysis is and the data for this 
particular study.
Methodology
The methodology for this research is a qualitative textual 
analysis; in particular, this study utilizes a framing analysis to 
look at the collected data.  A frame is a “central organizing 
idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what 
is at issue” (Kuypers, 2006, p. 7).  The process of framing, as 
Entman (2003) described it, is the selecting and highlighting 
some facets of events or issues, and making connections among 
them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, 
and/or solution.  Frames are powerful because they help 
“induce us to ﬁlter our perceptions of the world in particular 
ways, essentially making some aspects of our multidimensional 
reality more noticeable than other aspects” (Kuypers, 2006, p. 
186). Framing provides the means to make some information 
more salient than others.  They work to highlight some features 
of reality, while drawing our attention away from others 
(Entman, 1993; Gandy & Li, 2005; Kuypers, 2006).   For 
the general public, framing can shape the ways in which the 
general public can understand various problems.  Considering 
that the president is the most important actor in American 
foreign policy and that the American public has little to no 
understanding of international affairs, the president’s rhetoric 
shapes the ways in which the general public understands events 
outside the United States.  The way the president frames 
international events, including crises, affects how the public 
will view those events. 
Framing, as a method, provides the critic with the ability to 
describe the power of a particular text (Entman, 1993).  A 
framing analysis entails the critic analyzing the whole text 
searching within the discourse to ﬁnd the dominant frames 
used.  Critics look for key words, metaphors, concepts, 
symbols, and visual images, to determine the dominant frames 
(Entman, 1991).  The critic then takes these keywords and 
reassembles them in to larger thematic frames, which reveal the 
dominant frames used by the rhetor to construct the reality of 
the situation.  In this analysis, I will be examining a variety of 
public documents to determine the dominant frames Clinton 
used to construct his version of reality regarding the Mexican 
peso crisis and analyzing why that construction was considered 
a success.    
The data for this research is all of the public statements made 
by Clinton over a two month period from January 1995 to 
March 1995.  All of those documents are accessible through 
The Public Papers of the President, which can be found through 
accessing The American Presidency Project, an online database 
run by the University of California, Santa Barbara that has 
every public statement made by every president since 1789. 
A preliminary investigation of this database, using a key word 
search of “Mexico” and “economy” over this two month 
period, revealed over forty statements that may be relevant to 
this project.  Further investigation will mostly likely winnow 
this amount down somewhat, but there still will be plenty of 
data to complete this project.
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The framing procedure used after the date was collected started 
with an initial read through to gain a broad understanding of 
the rhetoric; following, there was a second and third reading 
where I searched for keywords and important phrases within 
the speeches; all the data was then collected onto a data sheet 
where it was then gone through again and further analyzed to 
pull out the particular frames being used by President Clinton. 
From that data, it was determined that three frames main 
frames were used throughout Clinton’s speeches: the nature of 
the crisis, a catalytic event, and the promotion of a solution.
Analysis
The Nature of the Crisis
Throughout the Mexican Peso Crisis, President Clinton and 
his foreign policy team attempted to educate the American 
public on the crisis to generate their support for any solutions 
created by the administration.  The president explained that: 
[T]his crisis came about because Mexico relied too 
heavily upon short-term foreign loans to pay for the 
huge upsurge in its imports from the United States 
and from other countries.  A large amount of the debts 
came due at a time when, because of the nature of 
the debts, it caused a serious cash ﬂow problem for 
Mexico, much like a family that expects to pay for a 
new home with the proceeds from the sale of its old 
house only to have the sale fall through” (1995d, ¶. 
13; 1995e, ¶. 9).
Mexico’s cash problems, according to Clinton, created a “short-
term liquidity crisis” and a large “budget deﬁcit” (see 1995c; 
1995d; 1995e; 1995g).  Additionally, as Clinton’s foreign policy 
team noted, this liquidity crisis caused the Mexican currency, 
the peso, to “hit an all time low” and drove the Mexican stock 
market down as much as “8 percent” (1995g, ¶. 21).  
In explaining the crisis to his fellow Americans, Clinton had 
two individual focuses.  First, he upholds that the crisis is going 
to be a “short term” crisis and not a long-term issue.  This 
assures the American people that this is not something they 
are going to have to deal with for decades to come but, rather, 
is something that will be over relatively quick.  Next, Clinton 
implores the analogy of a family for two speciﬁc reasons.  First, 
this analogy is something that really helps him to connect 
with the American public, whom are known to be very family 
oriented individuals.  Second, the analogy implies that Mexico 
is a part of the ‘American family,’ a child needing to be brought 
in from the cold.  Both of the implied meanings are meant 
by Clinton to draw sympathy for the Mexican economy and 
Mexican people.
A Catalytic Impact
Clinton framed the crisis created from Mexico’s “cash ﬂow 
problem” as having a “catalytic impact” upon the Mexican, 
American, and global economies.  We already noted some of 
the effects that it had on the Mexican economy.  However, 
Clinton spent most of time discussing two larger threads of 
thought. The ﬁrst thread running through the Catalytic Impact 
frame is on the effects it would have on the American economy 
and its leadership.  In terms of the American economy, Clinton 
argued that the Mexican Peso crisis was important “for the sake 
of millions of Americans whose jobs and livelihoods are tied to 
Mexico’s well-being” (1995e, ¶. 3).  Clinton maintained that:
 
Every American should understand what’s at stake and 
why it’s in the interest of working men and women all 
across our country to support Mexico.  Mexico is our 
third largest trading partner.  And already the goods 
and services we sell there support 700,000 American 
jobs.  Helping Mexico remain a strong and growing 
market for our exports is vital to our ability to help 
create the kind of high-paying jobs that give people 
their shot at the American dream.” (1995e, ¶. 5) 
Clinton further spoke of the crisis as a “danger to the economic 
future of the United States” (1995d, ¶. 6) because of our 
close ties to the Mexican economy, with so many American 
jobs being completely dependent on a “stable and prosperous” 
Mexico (1995c, ¶. 1).  Therefore, Clinton stated that it was 
in “America’s economic and strategic interest that Mexico 
succeeds.” (1995b, ¶. 3)  Clinton spoke further of the crisis as 
a “test of American leadership.” (1995g, ¶. 18)  He maintained 
that everything happening in Mexico was “America’s problem” 
(1995h, ¶. 4) and that it is, therefore, our job to take action 
and help to “give the Mexican people renewed hope for a more 
secure future.” (1995h, ¶. 4)
Another of Clinton’s focuses was on the effect that the crisis in 
Mexico could have on the remainder of the world’s economies, 
particularly in Latin America.  Clinton described the effect 
that the crisis could have on these economies as analogues of a 
virus that could “spread to other emerging countries in Latin 
America and in Asia” (1995d, ¶. 10).  Failure to act, Clinton 
said, would have “grave consequences for Mexico, for Latin 
America, for the entire developing world” (1995f, ¶. 17). 
The reason for this, Clinton said, is that Mexico acts as a sort 
of “bellwether for the rest of Latin America and developing 
countries throughout the world” (1995a, ¶. 26).
Promoting a Solution
The effect that the Mexican Peso crisis would have had on 
America and the rest of the world lead Clinton to promote a 
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solution for the crisis.  Clinton assured the American people 
that the loan mechanism that he and his staff wanted to put 
into place was not a loan but a guarantee.  He stated that:
These guarantees, it’s important to note, are not foreign 
aid.  They are not a gift.  They are not a bailout.  They 
are not United States Government loans.  They will 
not affect our current budget situation.  Rather they 
are the equivalent of co-signing a note, a note that 
Mexico can use to borrow money on its own account. 
(see 1995d, ¶. 15; 1995e, ¶. 10)
In this respect, Clinton is trying to show that America is merely 
going to act as an aid to Mexico and that after obtaining the 
aid Mexico will end out handling the situation on its own. 
However, this contradicts a previous statement by Clinton 
where he made Mexico seem like a child that needed to be 
brought in from the cold and cared for.  These statements draw 
a line in the discourse, but are present in many other issues in 
America’s history with Mexico where it always seems that while 
the United States government wants to aid Mexico, at the same 
time it wants Mexico to fend for itself.
The next important thread that Clinton uses in promoting a 
solution to the Mexican Peso crisis is assuring the American 
people that using this form of loan mechanism are not risky 
for the United States.  Clinton emphasized that the United 
States has had “loan mechanisms in place with Mexico 
since 1941” and that “Mexico has always made good on its 
obligations” (1995d, ¶. 16).  While promoting a solution 
for this crisis, Clinton reiterated the point that Mexico had 
made “extraordinary progress” in recent years and had “erased 
a budget deﬁcit” (1995d, ¶. 11).  Clinton effectually used 
this past trust that the United States has with Mexico and the 
progress that the country had been making previous to the crisis 
to help reassure the American people that aiding Mexico was 
not a risky move for the United States.  Further, he reassured 
the American people by promising that “Mexico will make 
an advance payment to us, like an insurance premium.  No 
guarantees will be issued until we are satisﬁed that Mexico can 
provide the assured means of repayment” (1995d, ¶. 15).
Conclusions
In this study, I utilized a framing analysis to discover how 
Clinton managed the Mexican Peso Crisis.  In my analysis it 
was discovered that Clinton used three basic frames: the nature 
of the crisis, a catalytic impact, and promoting a solution.  When 
discussing the nature of the crisis, Clinton had two main 
focuses.  First, he related that the crisis was a “short-term” issue 
and not a long term problem.  Second, Clinton implored the 
analogy of a family within his rhetoric.  When discussing the 
catalytic impact Clinton primarily focused on the effect that 
it would have on the American economy, as well as the effect 
that it would have on Latin America and the rest of the world 
economies.  When promoting a solution, Clinton ﬁrst detailed 
the loan mechanism that he and his staff wanted to put into 
place. Finally, Clinton reassured the American people that aiding 
Mexico was not going to be risky for the American economy 
by maintaining the United States has had a long standing loan 
mechanism in place with Mexico and that Mexico has always 
repaid their debts.
What we see from this analysis is that while Clinton’s rhetoric 
on the Mexican Peso crisis shares many of the characterizations 
already given to crisis rhetoric by scholars, the rhetoric also has 
several differences.  For example, while Clinton’s rhetoric was a 
part of the United States action during the crisis there was no 
justiﬁcation of military action by the government along with 
it.  If you’d recall, there was also no savage/civilization binary 
found within Clinton’s speeches, which points to an absence 
of an ‘enemy’ or ‘villain’ within rhetoric.  However, Bostdorff 
and O’Rourke (1997) found that only domestic crises do not 
contain villains.  They maintained that “domestic crises do not 
readily provide a tangible villain against which the nation can 
unite” (1997, p. 346).  Further, while some of Clinton’s rhetoric 
on the Mexican Peso Crisis could be classiﬁed as ‘deliberative’ 
(as he is seeking approval by Congress to take action) in the 
end, Clinton took action on his own and, therefore, was no 
longer seeking approval.  This leaves the remainder of Clinton’s 
rhetoric on the subject without a clear classiﬁcation, as set 
by Bonnie Dow.  From this we can conclude that we need 
a different way in which to look at economic crisis rhetoric 
because what we would typically ﬁnd in other forms of crisis 
rhetoric is not present here.   
In comparing this study’s ﬁndings with Bostdorff and 
O’Rourke’s study of President Kennedy and the U.S. Steel 
Crisis of 1962 I found that there were many similarities in the 
way that both presidents handled their crises.  Like Clinton, 
Kennedy ﬁrst explained what the problem was to the American 
people before detailing what the effects of this problem would 
be if it were not to be resolved quickly and ﬁnally offering a 
solution for the crisis.  It is for this reason that I would propose 
that this study be used as a model for future studies dealing 
with economic crisis rhetoric.
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